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What is it that a teacher of corporation law can bring to
a discussion of natural law? Perhaps it is principally his
concern with the problem of the criticism of rules of law.
I am awed, of course, by the mass of learning which has
accumulated around varying concepts of natural law­
learning which I have not even systematically sampled.
But twenty years of teaching law have so heightened my
concern over lawless debates about justice and law as to
remove many inhibitions. Without apology, therefore, I
may discuss the utility of a concept of natural law as a
basis for the criticism of rules and institutions of positive
law. But first let me summarize the change which these
twenty years have brought about in the law schools in
attitudes toward natural law.
I received my professional training in the twenties
when natural law was all but eclipsed, except in the
Roman Catholic law schools. The dominant legal philos­
ophy was a positivism in which law was merely the word
for what the officers of the State would enforce. Criticism
of legal rules, except in terms of their internal consist­
ency, was viewed as merely the assertion of the critic's
personal opinion. I remember the classmate who insisted
on an ethical point in our class in property law. In a
withering tone, the instructor advised him to transfer to
the divinity school if he was interested in such questions.
And when Morris Cohen wrote in defense of natural
law philosophy, he said that he expected his effort to
have the kind of reception which would be accorded to a
defense of belief in witchcraft.
It should not be overlooked that part of the hostility
to the concept of natural law was due to its abuse,
particularly in the history of the federal due process
clause. Mr . Justice Brewer had said in an address that
the demands of natural law "prevent that any private
property . . . should be subordinated . . . in the in­
terests of public health, morals, or welfare without
compensation." And it was on similar grounds that
legislation such as workmen's compensation was first
held unconstitutional.
Charles L. Goldberg, past president of the Milwaukee Bar
Association; Charles C. Erasmus, '29; Professor Wilber Katz;
and Harold Hallows, ;30, President of the Wisconsin State
Bar Association, at an Alumni Luncheon on the occasion of
the annual meeting of the Association in Eau Claire.
By the middle forties the general attitude toward nat­
ural law had strikingly changed. Perhaps the turning
point was the perversion of the legal order in Nazi
Germany. Legal relativism suddenly became ludicrous.
Faced with the Aryan laws, one could hardly comment.
that the National Socialists merely had a different view
of justice from ours. Books and articles were published
giving new and respectful attention to the natural law
tradition. To be sure, one of these was ridiculed by a
reviewer as "firing feather barrages" and as "reconciling
science and God and calling it law." But the reviewer
himself later published his own "brief statement of
democratic morals" in terms most of which a natural
law philosopher could easily accept.
My own introduction to natural law was largely at
the hands of my then colleague Mortimer Adler. In
this introduction I confess I was not deeply impressed
with the utility of the classic formulations of natural
law principles. But lowe to Mr. Adler the clue which
has led me to the position taken in this paper. Mr.
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Adler gave a course called Law and the Nature of
Man, an introduction to philosophical psychology. Par­
ticipation in this course convinced me that inquiry into
the nature of man is the most promising source of use­
ful natural law criteria. Nor was this conviction shaken
when a student librettist lampooned the course with
the parody: "Law and the Nature of Man, tra la, has
nothing to do with the law."
Let me first use the criminal law to illustrate how
analysis of legal problems brings one to basic questions
as to the nature of man. In my generation it has been
fashionable to take the position that criminal responsi­
bility is imposed either to deter (or prevent) further
crime or to reform the offender. Emphasis on one or
the other of these purposes usually reflects a distinct view
of human nature. To speak of reformation presupposes
a nature capable of moral development. To speak of
deterrence presupposes only a nature capable of condi­
tioning. When advocates of deterrence are faced with
evidence that the deterrent effect of punishment on the
criminal is very doubtful, they usually shift to the point
that others, potential criminals, are more effectively de­
terred. This is highly probable, but it raises the question
of the justice of punishing one man for the purpose of
conditioning others. This point would not be serious
if it were recognized that punishment is justified as
retribution, but retributory theories have generally been
rejected in recent decades. They have been dismissed as
mere rationalizations of vengeance and as utterly un­
acceptable in view of evidence as to the extent to which
crime is traceable to social and family conditions.
This confusion as to the basis of criminal responsi­
bility is not merely of academic concern. It has led to
confusion and vacillation as to the severity and type
of penalties imposed and as to the handling of border­
line cases of mental incompetence. And it mirrors an
unhealthy confusion in the public attitudes toward crime
and punishment.
A natural law approach to criminal law would require
the facing of questions such as these: Are criminal
tendencies unique to a criminal class or are they similar
to tendencies common to all men? Have men a freedom
of choice and a moral responsibility resting upon such
freedom or on some other basis? Are men capable of
moral development and under what general conditions
does moral development take place? Is it important in
this connection that men are treated as responsible for
their acts?
Here let me sketch very briefly the doctrine of man
in which Christians find answers to such questions.
With this view of the nature of man, I will comment
further on the criminal law and then consider some
aspects of the law of economic organization. A thumb­
nail sketch of the nature of man in the [udeo-Christian
tradition must include: first, man's capacity for creative
life in society; secondly, his tendency toward defensive
retreat from the frustrations of his limited creativity; and
thirdly, his freedom and responsibility with respect to
these tendencies. Inferences may then be drawn as to
man's proper good and as to conditions necessary for
his development toward this goal, conditions which
legal institutions may help to establish and maintain.
We begin thus with the capacities in virtue of which
man is said to be created in God's image. I shall only
suggest some of the items in the complex: man's power
of transcendence, his capacity for objective understand­
ing and appreciation, his critical intelligence, his crea­
tive imagination. These powers are developed and exer­
cised in a process of social interaction and in the con­
text of man's need for others and his capacity for
creative interpersonal relations.
But these human capacities are finite and their limits
involve disappointment and frustration. Men do not
readily accept their limitations in trustful dependence
on the providence of God. They attempt in varying
ways to escape these limitations and the pain incident
to them, either in aggressive and pretentious rebellion
against the limitations or in weak and slothful with­
drawal from the exercise of their powers. At the con­
scious level and in relation to God these tendencies
are called sin, but they are recognized more or less
clearly under other categories in secular philosophies
and in clinical science. And these reactions become
habitual and to a large extent unconscious. As in the
case of man's creativity, the context for these tendencies
is social and man's defensiveness typically appears in
patterns of domination and submission.
Has man freedom and responsibility in relation to
these tendencies? The answer of moral theology is yes,
but what more can be said? Here one approaches the
limit of human understanding. How am I to avoid
the alternate temptations to prideful assertion of some
pseudo-explanation or to slothful avoidance of a neces­
sary point in my paper?
(Continued on page 15)
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Does it help to note that men do three things III
relation to evil (i.e., defensiveness) in the world?
1. What they do predominantly is to transmit it.
Equipped with defensive habits largely caused by the
self-protectiveness of parents and others who influenced
their development, they meet defensiveness (whether
of the aggressive or submissive type) with counter de­
fense (again either aggressive or submissive). This is
the predominant pattern of human action, and in con­
sidering what legal institutions are suitable to man's
condition, it is well not to lose sight of this fact. For
this chain of defensive reactions man's responsibility is
primarily communal; it rests upon the race as a whole.
2. But man not only transmits evil, he increases it.
His freedom to do so is a mystery. Its exercise involves
responsibility in a different sense. It is individual re­
sponsibility, though the presence of Satan in the Genesis
story warns against prideful insistence on excl�sive guilt.
3. Man need not merely transmit or increase evil; he
may decrease it, not, to be sure, by his own power but
through the redemptive power of God. He is free to
be or not to be the channel of this power and he is re­
sponsible for the exercise of this freedom. The cost of
accepting this role is the pain of enduring without self­
protectiveness his share of the world's evil. And his
share includes primarily his own defensive tendencies.
To participate in God's redemptive work man must
accept painful self-knowledge and assume full and pain­
ful responsibility for his own acts regardless of how
completely they may have been determined by defen­
sive acts of others.
This view of man's powers suggests that his proper
good is the freeing and exercise of his capacity for
creative and loving response to the world and its in­
habitants. And man's advance to this end ordinarily
requires external conditions, conditions in which indi­
viduals are enabled to take the painful steps which
this advance requires. Certainly a measure of peace
and security is required if individuals are to learn to
control their defensive impulses. The environment also
must have such stability that it does not overtax man's
nascent and limited capacity for creative co-operation.
Men require also an environment which treats them as
persons, persons accorded freedom and held to responsi­
bility. But finally it must be an environment not de­
void of forgiveness.
With this rough summary of man's nature and tem­
poral goal, we may return briefly to our consideration
of the criminal law. If there is any validity to our view
of the natural law of man's present state, it should fol­
low that the law must somehow teach the sober fact of
responsibility and that in this sense criminal penalties
must be considered as retributory. And if the propriety
of retribution is thus granted, criminals are not unjustly
used if their punishment serves to promote peace and
order primarily by deterring others.
At the same time the criminal law may aim at ref­
ormation which, in the terms I have used, is a matter
of voluntary assumption of responsibility. Here, as well
as in mediating forgiveness, there are dangers of confus­
ing justice and mercy, but there is clearly room for de­
vices such as probation, parole, and individual and
group therapy.
In drawing the line as to mental incompetency, the
classical rules in Anglo-American law run in terms of
capacity to understand the character of one's act and
the distinction between right and wrong. The perennial
debate is over expanding the category of irresponsibles
to include those who have acted with this understand­
ing but pursuant to so-called "irresistible impulse." One
difficulty with this change is that medical experts often
disclaim any ability to discriminate in criminal cases be­
tween resistible and irresistible impulses and insist that
all criminals should be treated as sick and all criminal
acts considered as irresistibly impelled.
I will not say that the traditional rules have always
reached desirable results, but a natural law approach
indicates that the capacity to distinguish right from
wrong is not an element which should hastily be aban­
doned as a criterion of legal responsibility. To say that
law is retributive does not mean, of course, that legal
retribution should always be imposed where moral re­
sponsibility exists. Even the clearly insane may bear in
the sight of God a measure of responsibility for their
condition and their acts, but only the most primitive
law treats them as legally responsible. Similar legal im­
munity for those with certain types of emotional illness
may well be justified without weakening the force of
the moral teaching of the law.
The other legal field with which I wish to illustrate
the application of natural law criteria is that relating to
economic organization. Recent discussions have often
invoked the natural law in this area and usually for the
condemnation of the legal institutions of free market
enterprise. These institutions are based, of course, upon
the profit motive and consist of a pattern of markets for
goods, services, and capital through which are performed
three economic functions. These are the functions of
directing the allocation of resources in various lines of
productive activity, effecting a distribution of the social
product among the suppliers of productive services, and
determining the division of total income between con­
sumption and saving.
One of the most eloquent of the natural law criticisms
of free enterprise is that of Archbishop Temple in his
Christianity and the Social Order (first published in
1942). Among the counts in his indictment was this:
Production by its own natural law exists for consump­
tion. If, then, a system comes into being in which produc­
tion is regulated more by the profit obtainable for the
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producer than by the needs of the consumer, that system
is defying the Natural Law or Natural Order.
The same point had been made in the declaration of
the Malvern Conference of 1941, drafted by Archbishop
Temple and passed without dissenting vote by the
group of more than two hundred Churchmen, clerical
and lay. The conference also passed by a very large
majority a statement that the Church should declare
that permitting "ownership of the great resources of our
community" to be vested in private hands is a stumbling
block "making it harder for the generality of men to
lead Christian lives."
As long as these resources can be so owned, men will
strive for their ownership. Those who are most successful
in this struggle . . . will be regarded as the' leaders of our
economic life. They will thereby set the whole tone of our
society. As a consequence it will remain impossible to
abandon a way of life founded upon the supremacy of
the economic motive, or to advance nearer to a form of
society founded upon a belief in the authority of God's
plan for mankind.
Another criticism of free market economy was made
by the Rev. Charles W. Lowry in his recent book,
Christianity and Communism. He urged that in re­
jecting communism we should agree with the com­
munist criticism of the buying and selling of labor in
an impersonal market. I think it is fair to interpret this
also as an appeal to natural law.
Such criticisms of profit-seeking enterprise seem to
me one sided. The natural law which is relevant in the
practical criticism of positive law is the law of man's
present nature. It is not merely the law or structure of
the ideal community which is his goal. It includes also
the stubborn tendencies which St. Paul recognized as
the law in his members. And in the field under consid­
eration, this means, that natural law analysis must con­
sider fallen man's typical reaction to economic scarcity
(at whatever level of abundance). Here, as elsewhere,
some men respond to frustration with prideful aggres­
sion and others in weakness and fear. In the former
we see greedy acquisitiveness and display; in the latter,
laziness and envy.
The Malvern Declaration, to be sure, did note that
the exaltation of economic activity as though the pro­
duction of material wealth were man's true end is an
example of "the pervasiveness of human sin" and the
Declaration added that "this is as relevant to schemes
of reform to be operated by sinful men as to our judg­
ment of the situation in which we find ourselves." One
may question, however, whether more than lip service
was given to the point. The majority of the conferees,
as already noted, declared for public ownership and thus
for government fixing of wages and prices. They had
indeed been told that socialism requires
"
.... the con­
scious realization ... of a new relationship towards our
fellow men.... Socialism requires personal conversion.
It is nothing less than a religious process."
The majority were willing, however, to go ahead
with the legal change confident that the religious con­
version would follow. In this Christian Laborites in
Britain have been disappointed. I quote from the recent
confession of Sir Richard Acland (the man who drafted
the socialist resolution for the Malvern Conference).
He wrote in 1952:
Too often our speeches (including particularly some of
my own) ... left audiences with the impression, that
it would only be necessary to take big industries out of
the hands of big owners in order that . . . all our people
[should] work together as an enthusiastic and harmonious
team of incorruptible saints!
What he had learned was presumably something
about the problem of fixing wages by government ac­
tion. I infer that he' learned that fallen man finds it
difficult to accept the decisions of other fallen men as
to the worth of his contribution to the social product.
The stumbling block for government wage and price
fixing is the same as that in the path of voluntary agree­
ment and conciliation. So long as it is possible to exert
force, we may expect force to be exerted. In the case
of government wage and price fixing the force is that
of political pressure. We see the same process in opera­
tion in relation to government support of farm prices.
And when pressures reach the fallen men at top of the
government hierarchy, it is not surprising that they
resort to giving with one hand and taking away with
the other through monetary inflation.
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The trouble -with socialism, as a matter of natural
law (if I may borrow the language of William E.
Hocking with reference to communism)-the trouble
with socialism is that "it exaggerates the capacity of
human nature for community."
Archbishop Temple's own resolutions at Malvern did
not declare for socialism, but they included:
The status of man as man, independently of the economic
framework of industry; the rights of labor must be recog­
nized as in principle equal to those of capital in the con­
trol of industry, whatever the means by which this trans­
formation is effected.
One may question whether this involves any less op­
timism as to human nature than did the socialist reso­
lutions.
The Honorable Elmer J. Schnackenberg (J.D. '12), Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
at an informal evening discussion in Beecher Hall, the Law
School Dormitory.
My point is that a natural law approach to economic
institutions would consider the advantages of impersonal
markets in the light of man's greed and envy. I agree
with Mr. Lowry that men are not commodities; but
men being what they are, I believe that in a dynamic
economy it is good-in the sense of appropriate-to have
wages largely determined by the forces of competitive
markets. And the same goes for the products through
which farmers sell their labor.
I think this has some application even to the academic
community. I began to teach corporation law twenty
years ago and I was much affected by R. H. Tawney's
The Acquisitive Society. I was attracted by his principle
of distribution according to function, which he contrasts
with the principle of acquisitiveness. And whatever
might be true of the business world, I thought that the
academic community could certainly be governed by
Tawney's principle, that academic salaries could be fixed
according to contribution or function, measured in some
way other than by what a professor could get by going
to another school. This, it seemed to me, was the as­
serted policy of the university and when I became dean
I tried to take it seriously. I made it clear to the mem­
bers of the faculty that it would neither be necessary
nor of any use for them to encourage offers from other
schools as a means of securing advancement in our com­
munity. And I considered it my duty to appraise the
contribution of my respective colleagues, their needs,
etc., and make salary recommendations accordingly.
Now if I had understood the natural law, I would
have known that such an administrative policy is un­
natural as well as presumptuous. You will understand
that I was preserved from lynching and from insanity
solely by the fact that the market did work despite my
effort to exclude it. But I did not really get the point
until I realized the consequences of my effort to dis­
cuss with my superiors the question of my own salary
on the basis of worth or function. You will not be sur­
prised to hear that my estimate of the worth of my
services was somewhat higher than was theirs, and that
I overestimated also my capacity to discuss the matter
without corrosive bitterness.
In fairness to Mr. Lowry I should add that while he
cast aspersions on impersonal markets, his concrete
proposals as to the law were not open to criticism in
natural law terms. His legislative program was not one
of supplanting impersonal markets but of implement­
ing their freedom by checking of monopoly. The meas­
ures suggested included also taxation according to ability
to pay and control of money and credit. It is through
taxation and relief that the law may properly foster the
economic security which I listed among the conditions
necessary for man's moral development. And it is
through credit and fiscal policies that the law may check
violent fluctuations of business and employment with
the same end in view.
But while Mr. Lowry in the end assigned to the law
the role which, under conditions of American society,
the natural law suggests it should play in relation to
economic organization, statements such as that concern­
ing the buying and selling of labor seem to suggest other
types of legislative reform. Such statements contribute
to the moral bewilderment and political confusion of
Mrs. Rita Nadler discussing her academic schedule with
Dean of Students Lucas.
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our time. The same is true of statements such as that
of an Episcopal chaplain, lecturing in a university course
on the modern cultural crisis, who referred to institu­
tions of profit-seeking enterprise as "examples of the
well-nigh criminal irrationalities that result from con­
fusion of means and ends." Such statements invite re­
sponsible re-examination in terms of the law of man's na­
ture. And I fear that this applies also to many things
I have said or implied in my teaching of corporation law.
Let me close with a general comment as to the lim­
ited role of the positive law. The law can do little di­
rectly to correct the major heresy of our culture: the
exaltation of economic ow, other values. Furthermore,
we should not look to the law to define the basic prin­
ciple of our community or directly to promote it. As
Emil Brunner has said, "Justice may be able to remove
strife, but it cannot create community." The principal
reason is that man's voluntary advance toward com­
munity-his moral advance-requires economizing of
his limited capacity for co-operative decision. Man needs
an environment in which most things are settled by
custom or impersonal forces. in order that he may grow
in capacity for objectivity in personal relations.
One thing the law can do is keep inviolate (in the
words of one of the Malvern speakers) the principle
of "the maximum freedom of the voluntary associa­
tion outside the pattern of the ubiquitous State." This
suggests, of course, that natural law has something to
say about civil liberties and the freedom of associa­
tion and expression. But that would be another paper.
(The foregoing paper was presented at a meeting of the
Guild of Scholars in the Episcopal Church.)
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